Introduction
Consider a …rm that perfectly hedges the risky cash ‡ows from an expected inventory sale by buying a forward contract. Suppose the maturity of the forward contract is such that the payo¤ on the forward contract is realized before the cash in ‡ows from the inventory sale. If the forward transaction is viewed independently of the inventory sale, then the interim realization of the …rm's cash ‡ows from the forward contract is more volatile than the …rm's …nal net cash ‡ows. Such volatility in the …rm's interim cash ‡ows is however arti…cial, in the sense that the gain or loss on the forward contract will be exactly o¤set by the loss or gain on the inventory when it is sold. If markets function properly and all investors are fully Sapra acknowledges support from the FMC Faculty Research Fund at the Graduate School of Business, the University of Chicago. We thank Mehul Kamdar for his very capable research assistance.
informed, such interim volatility is therefore just a veil and all investors can see through it. However, there are several natural features of the …rm's environment that can prevent such interim volatility from merely being a veil.
First, investors may not know whether the …rm has a hedgeable or an unhedgeable project. For example, consider a …rm with a long term hedgeable project that buys a short term forward contract and thus correctly hedges, thereby increasing its short term volatility but reducing its long term volatility. On the other hand, consider another …rm that does not have a long term hedgeable project but its manager gets information that leads her to incorrectly buy a short term forward contract. The manager thus inadvertently speculates thereby increasing both its short term volatility and long term volatility. Investors in the market only observe the payo¤s of the forward contract and may not be able to distinguish between these two types of …rms.
Second, managers and shareholders of …rms may have short horizons and therefore dislike both short-run and long-run volatility. Thus, a …rm with a hedgeable project may not want to hedge when its perceived short-run volatility is increased because the market cannot distinguish between that particular …rm's exposure with that of another …rm with no hedgeable exposure that is exacerbating its short term and long term volatility by buying a forward contract.
Third, the e¤ect of volatility of the …rm's interim cash ‡ows may be magni…ed by the fact that the payo¤ of a particular …rm from hedging or not hedging depends on the actions of other …rms in the economy as well as the underlying fundamentals of the …rm. Each …rm chooses the action (of buying or not buying the forward contract) that maximizes its own payo¤ taking other …rms' actions as given. This may result in a social ine¢ ciency because the …rm does not take account of the social optimum when making its decision. Thus, if buying the forward contract is very costly because a …rm with a hedgeable exposure cannot easily separate itself from a …rm with an unhedgeable exposure, then it may turn out to be the case that none of the …rms will buy the forward contract resulting in widespread underhedging.
The specter of greater volatility of a …rm's short term cash ‡ows leading to detrimental economic consequences was recently at the center of the controversy surrounding the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133, (SFAS 133), Accounting for Derivatives and Hedging Activities. SFAS 133 requires …rms to mark periodically all their derivative instruments to market value. Prior to SFAS 133, information about a …rm's derivative activities was sparse. In mandating the accounting rule on derivatives, accounting regulators seemed to have adopted the position that derivatives create new risks that are not properly priced by the market. By providing information on the market value changes of …rms' derivative positions, …rms'risk characteristics will become more transparent to investors so that the risk could be better priced. On the other hand, many industry leaders have argued that, rather than creating new risks, derivative instruments are used to manage and reduce the risks inherent in their business. The industry leaders expressed concern that SFAS 133 will induce arti…cial volatility into the short term earnings or cash ‡ows of a …rm that is appropriately using derivatives to manage its long term risks. This volatility arises because of possible mismatches in the recognition of gains and losses on derivatives versus the corresponding gains and losses on underlying hedged items. .
Furthermore, there were also concerns that the volatility induced by SFAS 133
could have real e¤ects on …rms'risk management strategies. For example, in a letter to the FASB, Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board argued that "the treatment of cash ‡ow hedges will report an increase in the volatility of comprehensive income and stockholders'equity where no compa-rable increase in risk has occurred ... [so, the standard] may discourage prudent risk management activities." (Greenspan 1997 ).
Our main aim in this paper is to address the above concerns in a simple, yet fairly general model. We tackle the arguments made by the industry leaders headon and investigate whether the e¤ect of derivative disclosures could indeed impede sound risk management for cash ‡ow hedges. 1 In order to do so, we abstract away from all agency con ‡icts for engaging in derivative activities and instead assume that all …rms in our environment are run by benevolent managers who maximize the payo¤s of shareholders. To focus on the e¤ect of derivative disclosures on short term volatility, we assume (i) that shareholders have short horizons so that the managers are maximizing only short term payo¤s, (ii) the …rm is involved in a cash ‡ow hedge so that the payo¤s of the forward contract is realized before the payo¤s of the long term project, (iii) a …rm is endowed with either a hedgeable project or an unhedgeable project but the …rm cannot credibly disclose to the capital market that it has a hedgeable exposure. These three conditions ensure that short term volatility in the …rm's cash ‡ows matters.
More speci…cally, we model a …rm that undertakes a project with a long gestation that takes two periods to yield its terminal cash ‡ows. At date 0, when the manager is making the hedging decision, she does not know for sure whether or not the cash ‡ows from the project are hedgeable. However, the manager observes a private but noisy signal about the project type. Thus, even though the manager is uncertain about her project type, she is still better informed than the capital market about whether her …rm's project is hedgeable or not. Based on her superior information, at date 0, the manager then decides whether or not to hedge the date 2 cash ‡ows from the project by buying a forward contract. The forward 1 A cash ‡ow hedge is the hedge of a forecast transaction. In other words, the exposure is not on the books of the …rm but will occur in the future.
contract is a perfect hedge of a …rm's hedgeable project because the payo¤ from the forward contract is perfectly negatively correlated with the payo¤ from the hedgeable project. On the other hand, the payo¤ from the project may be unhedgeable in the sense that the payo¤ from forward contract is uncorrelated with the payo¤ from the project. To capture the industry concern that the volatility of a …rm's interim cash ‡ows of a …rm that is perfectly hedging may be higher than the volatility of its terminal cash ‡ows, we assume that the payo¤s from the forward contract is realized at date 1, instead of date 2. Thus, except for the sequential mismatch in the resolution of uncertainty, the cash ‡ows from the forward contract is a perfect hedge of the cash ‡ow from the hedgeable project. The manager makes the hedging decision at date 0 in order to minimize both the date 1 and the date 2 cash ‡ow variances. These variances, in turn, depend on what information is available to the capital market at date 1. We model two information regimes: a disclosure regime where a …rm is required to disclose whether or not it has purchased the forward contract and a non-disclosure regime where the …rm does not disclose any information about its derivative activities. If the …rm buys the forward contract, SFAS 133 requires the …rm to mark the forward contract to market at date 1 and thereby disclose the payo¤s on the forward contract. 2 However, when the capital market observes the forward contract at date 1, it is unsure whether or not the …rm has a hedgeable project. As discussed earlier, the …rm cannot credibly disclose to the market that it has a hedgeable project. This 2 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No 119, Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments, (SFAS 119) did require footnote disclosures of a …rm's gains and losses on most derivative instruments, even though the disclosure requirements were not as comprehensive as those of SFAS 133. Recognition of these derivative gains or losses on the …rm's balance sheet mandated by SFAS 133 or disclosure of these derivative gains or losses in the footnotes, mandated by SFAS 119, are informationally equivalent in our model. Therefore, to the extent that the capital market could also observe the derivative payo¤ from the footnote disclosures, our model captures the information environment of SFAS 119 as well.
occurs because the information that the …rm observes about its project type is imprecise at the time it makes its hedging decision. Therefore, a …rm with an unhedgeable project, basing its hedging decision on the best information that it has, could still incorrectly hedge and thereby speculate unintentionally, by buying the forward contract. 3 This feature of our model actually captures the FASB's concern that if the unhedgeable …rm buys a forward contract but does not disclose this information to the market, then the forward contract would create a new risk that would not be properly priced by the market.
A second objective of our paper is to shed some light on the general debate of mark to market accounting. In the wake of recent corporate scandals, there have been calls for greater transparency about a …rm's assets and liabilities. One of the controversial issues that accounting regulators have been debating is whether all …rms should adopt mark to market accounting. Our analysis shows that if a …rm cannot credibly communicate that the payo¤ from its project is hedgeable, then greater transparency could have detrimental consequences.
Our main result in the paper is that derivative disclosures lead to distortions in a …rm's risk management strategy but when derivative disclosures are not made, a …rm's risk management strategy is socially optimal. The nature of the distortions when derivative disclosures are made depend crucially on (i) the …rm's information quality about the project type and (ii) the market's prior beliefs that the …rm has a hedgeable project. We show that when …rms do not have very precise information about project types or the proportion of …rms with hedgeable projects is relatively 3 SFAS 133 requires …rms to determine whether derivative instruments are highly e¤ ective as hedging instruments A highly e¤ective hedge is one where the payo¤ from the hedge instrument and the expected underlying exposure have a high negative correlation If the hedge is highly e¤ective, the payo¤ from the forward ‡ows to comprehensive income. Otherwise, the forward contract transaction is speculative and the payo¤ from the forward ‡ows to earnings. E¤ec-tiveness tests are however based on a …rm's best information at the time it buys the forward contract and we are assuming that all …rms are highly e¤ective at dates 0 and 1 so that the capital market cannot distinguish a hedgeable …rm from an unhedgeable …rm at date 1. low, then there is massive underhedging in the economy relative to the social optimum. In fact, we show the existence of a unique equilibrium in which none of the …rms buy the forward contract. The intuition behind this result is as follows: any …rm that buys the forward must convince the market that it has a hedgeable project. However, when the ex ante incidence of hedgeable …rms is small or when the …rms'information is very noisy, the market exercises a great deal of scepticism about whether a …rm has a hedgeable project. In the face of such scepticism, a …rm's best reply is not to buy the forward given the hedging decisions of all the other …rms. We show that this is the best reply for all the …rms resulting in a large social ine¢ ciency. This result lends support to the claims made by industry leaders that derivative disclosures could induce imprudent risk management because …rms with hedgeable projects would forgo hedging. On the other hand, when the information of …rms is relatively precise and the proportion of …rms with hedgeable projects relatively high, there is excessive speculation in the economy relative to the social optimum. We show that all …rms in the economy buy the forward contract. This occurs because it is now very easy to convince the market that it has a hedgeable project by buying the forward contract so that all …rms buy the forward contract. This once again results in a large welfare loss because even the …rms with unhedgeable projects buy the forward contract. For intermediate levels of information quality and prior beliefs about the proportion of hedgeable …rms, there exists a unique interior equilibrium where some …rms buy the forward contract while the remainder do not. However, the incidence of hedging is sub-optimal.
To get a feel for reasonable levels of information quality in our model, we relate the informativeness of the signals that …rms observe with the probabilities of type I and type II errors. A type I error in our context is the error of not buying the forward contract when the …rm has a hedgeable project. A type II error is buying the forward when the …rm is unhedgeable. We focus on the decision rule that equates the probabilities of both types of errors. We show that for most reasonable levels of information quality, derivative disclosures will most likely result in excessive speculation rather than underhedging. In fact, underhedging virtually disappears when the type I and type II errors equal 10%. This result suggests that claims by industry leaders that derivative disclosures will lead …rms to forgo sound risk management may be tenuous. should be managed. He shows that hedge disclosures induce the …rm to engage in undesirable speculation but in the absence of hedge disclosures, the …rm does not engage in speculation. Our model is similar to the previous real e¤ects studies in that we abstract away from all agency con ‡icts in order to focus exclusively on the role of derivative disclosures on a …rm's risk management strategy. However, unlike the previous studies on derivative disclosures, …rms in our environment do not know for sure whether the cash ‡ows from their projects are hedgeable or not.
Our focus in this paper is on how the e¤ect of derivative disclosures on short term volatility of a …rm's cash ‡ows may a¤ect the incentives of a …rm to hedge when the capital market cannot distinguish a hedgeable …rm from an unhedgeable …rm.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We present the model in the next section. Section 3 establishes the socially optimal benchmark regime. Section 4 investigates the non-disclosure regime where derivative disclosures are not made at date 1.
Section 5 investigates the disclosure regime where …rms must disclose whether or not they have purchased the forward contract. Section 6 illustrates the role of information quality and the ex ante proportion of hedgeable …rms in determining the nature of the risk management distortions in the disclosure regime. Section 7 concludes.
The Model
There are three types of projects in the economy-a hedgeable project, an unhedgeable project and a forward contract. These projects are stochastic processes that yield the following cash ‡ows at two dates -date 1 and date 2.
The random variables f e w t ; e v t ; e z t g have distributions given as follows.
where the joint densities are such that the forward contract is a perfect hedge for the hedgeable project, except that there is a timing mismatch. The date 1 realization is perfectly negatively correlated with the date 2 realization of the hedgeable contract. The unhedgeable project has cash ‡ows that are uncorrelated with the other projects. Thus, we have corr (e v 1 ; e w 2 ) = 1
There are a continuum of …rms in the economy. Each …rm is endowed with either a hedgeable project or an unhedgeable project. We will call the …rm with a hedgeable project, a hedgeable …rm and the …rm with a unhedgeable project, an unhedgeable …rm. Of the group of unhedgeable …rms, we will assume that a small
proportion " > 0 of the …rms are speculative …rms in the sense that its managers know that they have the unhedgeable project, but nevertheless always buy the forward contract. These …rms'terminal values are given by the sum v 1 + z 2 . We introduce this perturbation for a technical reason which will become clearer later.
For all our results reported below, we will be taking the limit in which " ! 0.
The purpose of this device is to enable the market to derive o¤-equilibrium beliefs when it encounters a deviation by one …rm in buying the forward when starting from the status quo in which no …rm buys the forward contract. The market's Bayesian inference problem is not well de…ned when it encounters a …rm buying the forward when it had put zero probability on this event ex ante.
We want to capture a realistic feature of a …rm's hedging environment: the manager of a …rm may not know for sure whether the …rm is endowed with a hedgeable project or not. However, the manager of the …rm may have better information than the capital market about whether the …rm's project is hedgeable or not. She then bases her hedging decision on the best information that she has. We thus assume that the manager of the …rm observes a private signal on whether the project is hedgeable or not. If the …rm's project is hedgeable, the signal observed by the …rm is drawn with density 
is increasing in the signal x. The monotone likelihood ratio property thus holds.
Given that higher signals make it more likely that the …rm's project is hedgeable, it is natural to consider decision rules for the …rms in which there is a threshold value
x of the signal such that a …rm chooses to hedge and buy the forward contract if and only if the signal realization x is higher than the threshold x . Thus, in all our analyses, we will search for equilibria of the hedging game in which there is a common threshold x and all …rms use the following switching strategy:
Although an individual manager does not know whether her …rm is hedgeable, it is common knowledge that the fraction of the …rms is hedgeable. The remainder,
1 , of …rms is unhedgeable. For a given threshold x for the switching strategies of the …rms, we denote by h the proportion of those hedgeable …rms that decide to buy the forward contract. Denoting by F H ( ) the cumulative distribution function corresponding to f H , we have
Similarly, we will denote by s the proportion of unhedgeable …rms who decide to buy the forward contract. This group of …rms consist of the fraction " of speculative …rms that knowingly purchase the forward contract even though the …rm is unhedgeable, and those …rms with unhedgeable projects that incorrectly hedge and thereby speculate by buying the forward contract due to the high realization of its signal x. Thus, s is given by
The joint densities over the types of …rms and whether they buy the forward contract or not are then given by hedgeable …rms unhedgeable …rms buy forward h s (1 ) not buy forward
The date 2 liquidation values of the two types of …rms depend on whether or not they decide to buy the forward contract. The date 2 liquidation values are given by hedgeable …rms unhedgeable …rms buy forward
Structure of Signal Densities
Before we investigate the equilibrium hedge ratios in each accounting regime, it is important to impose some structure on the signal densities. As we will see later, this structure will also us to examine the properties of the …rst period and second period conditional variances which, in turn, will allow us to characterize the date 0 expected payo¤s of each …rm. In keeping with the normally distributed fundamentals of the problem, we will also invoke signals that are normally distributed, or rather, the approximation of the normal density given by the logistic density 4 . This choice will allow considerable simpli…cation of the algebra and enable us to conduct comparative statics analysis on the informativeness of the signals. We will assume that the signals of the unhedgeable …rms are drawn from the cumulative distribution:
while the signals of the hedgeable …rms are drawn from the cumulative distribution:
where > 0. Thus, is the mean of the density f N for non-hedgeable …rms while the mean of the density f H for hedgeable …rms is given by + .
The positive constant is a measure of the informativeness of the signals of the …rms. The larger is , the more informative are the signals about whether or not the …rm has a hedgeable project, since the signals are drawn from densities that are far apart. It can be easily veri…ed that the signals satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property. We will investigate the relationship between the informativeness measure and the probability of type I and type II errors later.
Given our assumptions on the signal densities and assuming that all …rms use a switching strategy described by the inequalities in (2.1), we can solve explicitly for the proportion s of speculative …rms as a function of the proportion h of hedgeable …rms. For any threshold x , we have
The second equation implies that x = + + ln The above analysis implies that the informativeness measure, , of the signals will play a crucial role in determining the optimal hedge ratios in each accounting regime. Intuitively, the less informative the signals are, the more costly it will be for a hedgeable …rm that buys a forward contract (and is therefore properly hedging its terminal cash ‡ows) to distinguish itself from an unhedgeable …rm that is exacerbating the riskiness of its terminal cash ‡ows by buying a forward contract.
Socially Optimal Hedge Ratio: Benchmark Regime
The social welfare optimum for a risk averse population would be for all …rms to minimize their terminal volatility. Suppose each …rm knew for sure whether or not its project were hedgeable, then all hedgeable …rms should buy the forward contract, and all unhedgeable …rms should not buy the forward contract. This implies that the socially optimal hedge ratio h ( ) = 1 for all so that the resulting ex ante terminal volatility would be (1 ) 2 2 , the ex ante terminal volatility of the unhedgeable …rms. However, this welfare optimum is unattainable in our environment because each …rm faces uncertainty about whether or not its project is hedgeable. We will therefore derive the ex ante socially optimal hedge ratio, h ( ); given that each …rm is uncertain of its project type but observes a noisy private signal about it.
From the perspective of date 0, the …nal liquidation value of the …rm is described by the random variable e de…ned as
where s is written as a function of h to take into account the explicit dependence of the proportion of speculative …rms on the proportion of hedgeable …rms as described by equation (2.4).
We assume that the date 0 hedging decision is determined by the manager's ex ante utility function U ( ) de…ned as
where E( e ) is the date 0 expected liquidation value of the …rm and V ar( e ) is the date 0 variance of the …rm's …nal liquidation value and k is a positive constant. If the shareholders of the representative …rm have CARA preferences with aggregate risk aversion coe¢ cient k, then their expected utility will take the form described in 3.2. Note that U is increasing in the …rm's expected liquidation value and decreasing in the variance of the …rm's liquidation value. Because E( e ) = 1;
this implies that the socially optimal hedge ratio h ( ; ) minimizes the date 0 variance of the …rm's …nal liquidation value. The variance of the …rm's …nal liquidation value is the quadratic form:
where
Substituting for a and in equation (3.3) , we get the following expression for the ex ante date 0 variance the …rm's …nal liquidation value:
Proposition 1. The socially optimal hedge ratio, h ( ; ), is given by:
Proof. See Appendix. The socially optimum hedge ratio will serve as a benchmark against which we will compare the equilibrium hedge ratios in two information regimes: a disclosure regime where a …rm is required to disclose whether or not it has purchased the forward contract at the interim date 1 and a non-disclosure regime where a …rm does not disclose any information about its forward contract until the terminal date 2.
As we discussed earlier, if the …rm only cares about its terminal volatility, then issues about disclosure or non disclosure of the forward contract at date 1 are moot.
However, we will show that when the manager the …rm or the …rm's shareholders have short horizon payo¤s that depend on both its interim and terminal volatility, the incentives to purchase the forward contract will be perverse: the …rm may either underhedge and thus not undertake sound risk management or overhedge and thus speculate by taking on excessive risk. For each information regime, we will thus examine the incentives of a …rm to purchase the forward contract when the …rm's payo¤s depend on both their interim volatility and terminal volatility.
Non-Disclosure Regime
In the non-disclosure regime, at date 0 the …rm observes a private signal x about whether it has a hedgeable project or not. At the interim date 1, the …rm does not disclose any information about whether or not it has purchased the forward contract until date 2, when the terminal cash ‡ows from the …rm's project are realized. The only information publicly observable at date 1 in the non-disclosure regime is v 1 , the payo¤ from the forward contract. However, the capital market does not observe whether or not a …rm has purchased a forward contract. This information regime approximately captures the information environment before the derivative disclosure standard (SFAS 133) was mandated in 2000.
Suppose …rms are run by short horizon managers who dislike both date 1 and date 2 variance. Their hedging decisions at date 0 is determined by the utility function U E e V 1 ;
where 2 1 is the volatility of …rst period market value when viewed from date 0 and E e V 1 is the date 0 expected value of the …rm.
Suppose the date 1 value, V 1 ; of the …rm is given by:
where e is the terminal value of the …rm given by (3.1). If shareholders in the capital market have CARA preferences and aggregate risk aversion, k, then the market clearing price of the …rm at date 1 would take the form in equation (4.2).
Because the capital market does not observe whether or not the …rm has purchased the forward contract, the information set of the capital market at date 1 consists only of v 1 :
Substituting for e in (4:2) yields the following expression for V 1 :
Substituting for V 1 in (4.1) yields:
Thus, the …rm chooses h to minimize the following volatility:
But this is exactly the ex ante volatility of the …rm's terminal cash ‡ows described by equation (3.4) . This leads to the following result.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium hedge ratio in the non-disclosure regime is equal to the ex ante socially optimal hedge ratio.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: given that the forward contract is not disclosed at date 1, a …rm's decision to purchase the forward contract cannot in ‡uence the …rm's …rst period value, but only its second period conditional volatility. So, the …rm's objective function is just the same as the socially optimum ex ante objective function.
We should not take this result at face value for the purpose of policy. We have deliberately abstracted away from all agency problems in formulating our model in order to concentrate on the consequences of volatility for hedging decisions.
Instead, the above proposition should be seen merely as a benchmark against which we examine the case of mandatory disclosures. We now turn to this case.
Disclosure Regime
In the disclosure regime, the …rm observes at date 0 a private signal x about whether or not it has a hedgeable project . However unlike the non-disclosure regime, at date 1, the …rm is required to disclose whether or not it has bought the forward contract. Thus, at date 1, the capital market observes not only the payo¤ v 1 from the forward contract but also whether or not the …rm has purchased the forward contract.
Expected Payo¤s of a disclosing …rm
We will derive the payo¤s of …rms that purchase the forward contract. In the disclosing regime, these …rms must disclose the forward contract. Suppose at date 1, the …rm discloses the outcome of the forward contract. The market then puts conditional probability h h + s (1 )
that the …rm has a hedgeable project, and conditional probability
that the …rm has an unhedgeable project. Thus, from the market's point of view at date 1, the …nal liquidation value of the disclosing …rm at date 2 is the random variable:
Therefore, the date 1 expected value of e d given the market's information is:
We can also calculate the conditional volatility of …nal liquidation value of the …rm when viewed from date 1. It is given by:
The market value, V d 1 , of the disclosing …rm at date 1 is therefore given by:
When viewed from date 0, the payo¤ from the forward contract, e v 1 ; is a random variable so that the ex ante expected value of the disclosing …rm's interim market value is:
and the volatility of the disclosing …rm's interim market value at date 1 is given
It is noticeable that for the disclosing …rm, the date 1 and the date 2 conditional variances are the same.
The payo¤s of a short horizon manager of a disclosing …rm who maximizes the expected utility of date 1 cash ‡ows, V d 1 , is then given by:
Expected Payo¤s of a non-disclosing …rm
Let us now turn to the …rms that do not purchase the forward contract and hence do not disclose the forward contract. Conditional on no disclosure of the forward, the probability that the …rm is a hedgeable …rm is:
The conditional probability of the …rm being unhedgeable is
Thus, from the market's point of view at date 1, the …nal liquidation value of the non-disclosing …rm at date 2 is the random variable:
The date 1 expected value of e n given the market's information is
The conditional volatility of …nal liquidation value of the non-disclosing …rm when viewed from date 1 is given by 2 n;2 E e n y n jv 1
The market value, V n 1 , of the non-disclosing …rm at date 1 is therefore given by:
When viewed from date 0, the payo¤ from the forward contract, e v 1 ; is a random variable so that the ex ante expected value of the non-disclosing …rm's interim market value is:
and the volatility of the non-disclosing …rm's interim value at date 1 is given by
The payo¤s of a short horizon manager of a non-disclosing …rm who maximizes the expected utility of date 1 cash ‡ows, V n 1 , is then given by:
Equilibria in the Disclosure Regime
We will search for equilibria in which there is a common threshold x and all …rms use the following switching strategy:
Since each …rm's ex ante probability of hedging is a monotonic function of its switching point x i , we could write the ex ante payo¤s of buying or not buying the forward contract in terms of the switching points fx i g. However, we will see below that it is convenient to work directly with h in our analysis. Because the proportion h of hedgeable …rms is a monotonic function of x and from equation (2.4), the proportion, s, of unhedgeable …rms that buy the forward is monotonic in h; the ex ante payo¤s from buying the forward contract and from not buying the forward contract can be written solely as a function of h as follows.
From (5.1), the ex ante payo¤, U D (h) from buying the forward contract is:
Similarly, from (5.4), the ex ante payo¤, U N D (h) from not buying the forward contract is:
The ex ante payo¤s U D (h) and U N D (h) de…ne a normal form, binary action game among the continuum of …rms, and our equilibrium notion is the plain Nash equilibrium notion for normal form perfect information games. An equilibrium is a pro…le of decisions i.e., whether to buy or not to but the forward contractone for each …rm -such that, one …rm's decision maximizes its payo¤ given the decisions of all the other …rms.
We may consider three possible types of equilibrium. The …rst is when no …rm buys the forward contract. Such an equilibrium exists when
so that when no-one buys the forward (i.e. h = 0), it is better not to buy the forward oneself. The second type of equilibrium is when every …rm buys the forward. Such an equilibrium exists when
so that when everyone buys the forward (i.e. h = 1), it is better to buy the forward oneself. Finally, we could also have an interior equilibrium in which there is some fraction h (strictly between zero and one) of …rms that buy the forward that makes all …rms indi¤erent between buying the forward or not. In other words
Before we characterize the equilibria in the disclosure regime more fully, let us …rst note that there is always an equilibrium in the disclosure regime when none of the …rms buy the forward contract. In other words, there is always an equilibrium with h = 0. To see this, note that
. This result, however, rests to a large extent on our technical assumption that there is always a small proportion " of unhedgeable …rms who speculate by buying the forward contract regardless of the signal received. We make this assumption simply for the technical reason that o¤-equilibrium beliefs must be de…ned for h = 0. For this reason, it would not be warranted to claim any important status to this result.
However, if the only equilibrium is the one in which h = 0, then such a result would be more noteworthy. Such a result would lend support to Greenspan's argument quoted earlier that disclosures impede risk management. For some parameter values, it turns out that the only equilibrium is the one in which h = 0.
Then there is a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, no …rm buys the forward contract.
Proof. See Appendix Condition (5.5) de…nes the region in ( ; )-space in which none of the …rms buy the forward contract in equilibrium. This condition is intuitive, since it is likely to be satis…ed when is small (so that the …rms' signals are very noisy) and when is small, making it less likely ex ante that buying the forward will ful…l a hedging function. The welfare consequences of the lack of hedging activity in this equilibrium could be potentially very large, especially when the socially optimal level of purchase of the forward contract is large. We explore these issues in more detail in the next section.
It is also important to understand why the ex ante optimal h given by proposition 1 cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. In equilibrium, each …rm chooses the action that maximizes its own payo¤ taking others actions as given. The …rm does not take account of the social optimum when making its decision. Any …rm that buys the forward must convince the market that it has a hedgeable project.
However, when the ex ante incidence of hedgeable …rms is small (i.e. is small),
or when the signals are very noisy ( is small), the market exercises a great deal of scepticism. In the face of such scepticism, a …rm's best reply is not to buy the forward. This is the best reply for all the …rms. Thus, none of them hedge, and the unique equilibrium is the one in which h = 0.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, we can also have an equilibrium in which there is excessive purchase of the forward contract in the sense that the equilibrium level of h is higher than the socially optimal level. In particular, we can identify the parameter values in which every …rm buys the forward contract, so that h = 1.
Then there exists an equilibrium in which h = 1. There is no interior equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix
Condition (5.6) de…nes the region in ( ; )-space in which all …rms buy the forward contract. It shows that for a relative large values of and , every …rm in the economy hedges. This overhedging occurs for analogous reasons as that described for the h = 0 case. There is a preponderance of hedgeable …rms in the economy ( is large), and …rms have precise signals. Thus, a …rm needs to do little to convince the market that it has a hedgeable project. However, the problem is that it is now too easy to convince the market. However precise the signal, pushing h up to 1 means that s (the incidence of inadvertent speculation by unhedgeable …rms) is also pushed up to 1. This social ine¢ ciency is not taken into account by the individual …rms. In between the two boundaries is the region where an interior equilibrium is possible. In this region, a …rm is indi¤erent between buying the forward and not buying the forward.
then there is an interior equilibrium in which h is strictly between zero and one.
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Risk Management Distortions in Disclosure Regime
How do the equilibrium hedge ratios in the disclosure regime compare with the social optimum for di¤erent values of and ? The larger the divergence between the two, the greater is the social welfare loss that results from the disclosure regime. We can illustrate the nature of the distortions by plotting the socially optimal hedge ratio against the equilibrium hedge ratio in the disclosure regime as the function of , the ex ante incidence of hedgeable …rms. We plot three such cases -for = 0, = 1 and = 3. Figure 6 .1 shows that when = 0, (so that the signals observed by the …rms are worthless), the socially optimal hedge ratio is given by the 45 degree line. That is, the optimal hedge ratio is given by itself. However, the equilibrium hedge ratio displays a very di¤erent shape. It is a jump function that takes the value zero when < 0:5, and takes the value 1 when > 0:5. The intuition is clear.
When the signal is worthless, the only information that the market can rely on is the ex ante incidence . When is less than 0.5, any …rm that buys the forward contract will be viewed as being taking an unjusti…ed risk, and will be marked down. Hence, every …rm will refrain from buying the forward. Conversely, when > 0:5, the ex ante incidence justi…es buying the forward contract. Each …rm is in the same situation, and so all …rms end up by buying the forward. When is close to 0.5, the social e¢ ciency loss can be substantial. A type II error is buying the forward when the …rm is unhedgeable. For any given decision rule, we can associate the probability of type I and type II errors.
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Then, the probability of a type I error is given by the area under F H to the left of x , which is
where F (:) is the c.d.f. of the logistic distribution with mean zero. That is Figure 6 .4 shows how is related to the error probability (6.1).
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Conclusion
Using a simple model, we formalize the claims of industry leaders that derivative disclosures may impede sound risk management. In order to do so, we have abstracted away from all agency con ‡icts in order to focus exclusively on the e¤ects of short term volatility on …rms'risk management decisions. when the information of …rms is relatively precise and the proportion of …rms with hedgeable projects relatively high, there is excessive speculation in the economy relative to the social optimum. However, for most reasonable levels of information quality, we …nd that instead of impeding risk management, derivative disclosures are likely to induce …rms to engage in excessive speculation. Similarly, h 1 is not relevant because it lies outside the unit interval. Finally, h 2 lies strictly between 0 and 1 and is therefore the relevant root for our purposes.
Proof of Proposition 3
From (5.3), the expected payo¤ from buying the forward contract is given by: Similarly, from (5.4):
The h ( ; ) = 1 boundary region is de…ned by the following equation: 
